Making the Global Economy Work for Every one

Introduction

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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One

Making the Global Economy Work for Every one

In January 2017, Donald J. Trump was sworn in as president of the United States. His election reflected a tide of populist dissatisfaction with economic stagnation, and the perceived threats of globalization and immigration, although of course there were other factors at work in his victory.

In his inaugural address, Trump acknowledged popu lar discontent with globalization explic itly and repeatedly. One excerpt:

From this day forward, it’s going to be only Amer i ca first. Amer i ca first. Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs will be made to benefit American workers and American families. We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our compa- nies and destroying our jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.

Despite his harsh rhe toric, Trump’s diagnosis and policy so- lutions are attractive to many Americans, including some on the left. And these nationalist sentiments are not a uniquely American phenomenon; backlashes against globalization have intensified in many other countries, from both the right and left ends of the po liti cal spectrum.

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Introduction

4

This book defends global economic integration, arguing from a perspective that consistently prioritizes the needs of American workers. The substantial challenges of middle- class economic stagnation and increasing income in equality require bold, serious policy responses. But they don’t require a retreat from globalization.

The plight of the American worker is very real. For de cades, economic in equality has increased, and the vast majority of income growth in our economy has ended up in very few hands. Median wages have grown very slowly and, for the first time in generations, American children can no longer reasonably expect standards of living higher than those of their parents.1

At the same time, the importance of capital and corporate profits in the economy has surged; since 2000, corporate profits are 50  percent higher as a share of national income than they were in previous de cades, and the share of national income ac- cruing to workers as wages has fallen steadily.2

These changes have been systematic, they have happened over de cades, and they are large. Indeed, these are the most pressing economic prob lems of modern- day Amer i ca. How- ever, knee- jerk solutions to these prob lems risk making matters worse, harming the very people they claim to help, hurting the future potential of the economy, and weakening our in- ternational relations and our capacity to respond to policy challenges.

Blaming foreigners ( whether trading partners or immigrants) implies quick and easy solutions to our economic prob lems. With more restrictive immigration laws, tighter borders, tariff barriers, tough negotiating with our trading partners, and tough talks with our own companies, we are promised a return to the halcyon days of yore: a time when the American dream

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Making the Global Economy Work for Every one

5

was alive and well, economic growth benefited all, and children grew up to earn more than their parents.

As po liti cally palatable as these quick- and- easy solutions may be, they are dangerous and wrongheaded, more likely to hurt the very people who voted for them than to return us all to easier times. For example, tariffs on foreign products will make the foreign goods we buy at the store more expensive, harming our purchasing power as consumers. While tariffs ad- vantage domestic companies over foreign ones, any resources that move into producing goods that would other wise have been imported have to come from somewhere. Other sectors of the economy will contract. This will subject the labor market to more “shocks,” as industries that produce the formerly im- ported goods expand, while other industries contract.

While there will be more demand for labor at companies that make the goods that were previously imported, tariffs will not remove the incentive to innovate and mechanize to make production more efficient. Indeed, technological pro gress is a larger threat to American workers than foreign trade is. Al- most every study comparing the two forces argues that tech- nological change has had the more dominant influence on US labor markets.

So should we instead rally against our computers? Perhaps so. If we simply discarded our computers, dumping them into the harbor like so much imperial tea, that would generate a great deal of demand for labor throughout the US economy. We would need labor to do all those things computers used to do more efficiently: computations, filing, data entry, and consumer interactions of all sorts, from booking travel to selling clothes to trading financial assets. Of course, giving up computers would put us at a tremendous disadvantage

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Introduction

6

relative to workers and consumers in other countries who had access to these technologies. Forsaking technology would also generate huge shocks to the economy, as those industries that relied on computers for their production pro cesses would be harmed, and those workers who used computers to be more productive would see their productivity decline. Further, people really enjoy all the modern con ve niences that computers provide; they would not easily give up their smartphones, movie streaming, computer games, and online shopping—or even their less frivolous work efficiency.

Yet turning to trade protectionism, and reducing immigra- tion, generates shocks that are quite analogous to the shocks associated with giving up technological pro gress. Thirty per- cent tariffs would make almost every item at Gap or Walmart 30 percent more expensive. Steel tariffs harm workers in indus- tries using steel as an input, such as construction. Retaliation from trading partners hurts workers making US exports. Re- strictive immigration policies harm the technological leads of our companies, and fewer immigrants mean fewer entrepre- neurs in Silicon Valley and beyond. Withdrawing from trade agreements and negotiating “tougher” terms with our partners gives us fewer friends and weaker allies, making battles against terrorism and climate change more difficult.3 Reducing the mutual economic interests that link China and the United States makes it more likely that small disagreements transform into broader conflict.

In short, blaming foreigners is easy, but acting on that blame with policies is dangerous and shortsighted. There are a lot of truly wonderful things about international trade, international capital mobility, international business, and international mi- gration that we risk when we threaten globalization. There is

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Making the Global Economy Work for Every one

7

a good reason why almost every economist on the planet values international economic integration. The case for global mar- kets is strong indeed.

Yet economists peddling international integration have not always explained clearly and persuasively what is at stake. Equally impor tant, they have not spent enough time reckoning with those harmed by the forces of globalization. While plenty of economists study the economic in equality, job loss, and dis- ruption that are caused by the forces of globalization and technical change, they often shy away from the difficult ques- tions of how to address these prob lems in a po liti cally feasible way. It is a quite common affliction of the economist to smugly pronounce what an optimal policy would look like, acknowl- edge that such a policy may prove po liti cally contentious or im- possible, and then pass off the resulting prob lem as one of “politics,” a field too dirty for clean hands.

Something more is required today. It is not enough to simply show that free international trade and unfettered technolog- ical pro gress are optimal for society. It is not enough to explain that these forces create enough gains for society so that “win- ners” can compensate “losers,” and then walk away, dusting off one’s hands, job done. We need to engage with the “art of the pos si ble.” At times, settling for rough justice and second- best (or third- best) policies is better than insisting on the ideal out- come as seen from thirty thousand feet, disengaged from the po liti cal mess on the ground.

For the arguments for trade, immigration, and technolog- ical pro gress to be persuasive, the losers from these policies must be reckoned with. The winners actually need to compen- sate the losers. Economic growth has to be broad enough to benefit all, or at least the vast majority of, Americans. Along

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Introduction

8

these lines, there are many easily identified policies that would help American workers, such as a more progressive tax system, more society- wide investments in education and infrastruc- ture, and a more robust safety net to catch workers who are left behind.

Yet, while we have made some incremental pro gress here and there, policy- makers have too often been more interested in conflict than compromise. At pres ent, there is a large po- liti cal prob lem. The very po liti cal polarization that has resulted from economic in equality has made it much harder to come up with an effective policy response to the in equality.4

Solving this prob lem is not easy, but it begins with a battle of ideas. This book argues that economic in equality is indeed the dominant economic prob lem of our time, but that the policy solutions to this prob lem should involve both an em- brace of globalization, trade agreements, immigration, and international business, and a much more thorough policy framework to make sure that the benefits from these economic forces accrue to all Americans. The opposite approach—of erecting walls and trade barriers while dismantling safety nets (by, for example, making health insurance more expensive for the poor) and providing tax cuts for those at the top of the in- come distribution—is dangerous and misguided. It will leave the United States a poorer nation with fewer friends, and it will hurt the very workers it claims to help.

The Road Ahead

The remainder of this introduction takes you through the main arguments of the book ahead, or ga nized by chapter.

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Making the Global Economy Work for Every one

9

Chapter 2 documents the large, vexing prob lems of middle- class wage stagnation and rising income in equality. While the period from 1946 to 1980 generated broadly shared economic prosperity, the period since 1980 is another story. Incomes at the top of the income distribution have surged, whereas the in- comes of the bottom half of the population have been entirely stagnant. These trends have left a large part of the population disappointed. House holds are indebted, economic insecurity is widespread, and discontent is expressed through votes for po liti cally polarized candidates. Chapter  2 explores the causes of these trends. Foremost is technological change, which has transformed our lives in the years since 1980. Trade and global competition have also contributed to making work- places more competitive, hurting some workers. But other factors also play crucial roles, including the phenomenon of “superstars” driving huge pay packages at the top, the rise in business profits resulting from market power and innovation, changes in social norms and bargaining power across groups, and large changes in tax policy.

Chapters  3 to 5 consider international trade. Chapter  3 makes the case for international trade, beginning with intui- tive arguments. Just as it is nearly impossible for individuals to produce all the things they wish to consume, it would be foolish for one country to make every thing its people desire. The United States could produce its own T- shirts, shoes, and bananas, and we could also forsake foreign va ri e ties of cars, appliances, and wine, but these choices would come at a large cost. The resources we devoted to making goods previously im- ported would have to be pulled from other parts of the economy, shrinking those sectors. Making every thing our- selves would mean fewer economies of scale and fewer choices

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Introduction

10

for consumers. In the end, the country would be far poorer without the benefits of international trade.

In fact, the international community punishes wayward countries by withholding trade; economic sanctions are used as weapons precisely because they impose great costs by re- moving the gains from trade. Chapter 3 explains that interna- tional trade has been a power ful force for good in the world economy, raising living standards both at home and abroad. This chapter also explains how high- wage countries like the United States, Denmark, and Japan still manage to “compete” in the world economy with countries like India, China, and Mexico, where workers are paid less.

Chapter 4 tackles the impor tant distributional consequences of trade, showing that international trade generates both win- ners and losers. Without strong accompanying policies, we have no way to be sure that large segments of society are not harmed by trade. In the United States, international trade is more likely to reward cap i tal ists and high- income, high- skill workers, while reducing wages and opportunities for low- income, low- skill workers. Chapter  4 also tackles other sources of workers’ woes, and most importantly, the effects of rapid technological change, including automation and the rapid spread of computers and the Internet. These technolog- ical forces have been more impor tant than international trade in terms of harmful effects on low- and middle- income workers. Mechanization and computerization have replaced labor in many jobs, and the same technological changes have created outsized profits for those at the top of society. Beyond these two big trends, mono poly profits and luck also play impor tant roles in generating the large pay packages of those at the top. It was recently reported that eight people have a

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Making the Global Economy Work for Every one

11

combined wealth that is similar to that of the bottom half of the world’s people.5 This type of wealth is typically the result of luck and market power. And this concentration of income has impor tant effects on social norms, the bargaining posi- tion of workers, and the concentration of po liti cal power.

Chapter 5 considers both trade politics and trade policies. People have two big economic roles in their lives: every one is both a producer and a consumer. Trade can make life un- comfortable for us in our producer roles, by heightening com- petition. (If a professor in India or Sweden teaches a better economics course online, will there be no more demand for my ser vices?) But in our consumer roles, our lives are made more comfortable by trade. Low prices, broad availability, and a staggering variety of goods all benefit consumers, and these benefits are particularly large for lower- and middle- income house holds.

How can the United States keep the benefits of trade while reducing the collateral damage? Ending trade agreements is not the answer. Rather, new and better trade agreements will help solve these prob lems. International agreements help coun- tries coordinate, avoiding harmful policy competition. Other impor tant steps we can take on our own. The best way to help workers is to focus on workers. Investments in education, training, and infrastructure will increase the productivity and wages of American workers. Changes in the tax system will help economic growth translate into increased well- being for most Americans. Wage insurance can help workers who have lost high- paying jobs.

Chapters 6 to 8 discuss the international mobility of capital and labor. Chapter 6 considers international capital markets. Consider the United States and China. The Chinese save a

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Introduction

12

lot— more than they invest in plant and equipment. In com- parison, US savings are low, and our desired investments exceed our savings. Therefore, the United States (as a whole) bor- rows from China; this borrowing is the flip side of our trade deficit with China. We receive more goods from China than we send to China, and China accumulates US assets (like US government bonds) in response, effectively loaning us money. This benefits both countries. US companies (and the govern- ment) can borrow at lower interest rates, and US consumers receive more goods to consume. Chinese savers get safe re- turns on their assets, and China benefits from export- driven growth.

Politicians and journalists too often treat these imbalances as a marker in some strug gle for global supremacy, the score of a zero- sum game. The US trade deficit is not a moral failure that places us at a disadvantage on the global chess board. Trade balances have little to do with the competitiveness of a country’s companies or workers. At current levels, reducing the trade deficit should not be a policy priority.

Chapter 7 discusses international business. Multinational corporations are becoming larger and more impor tant. Among publicly- traded companies, those with more than a billion dol- lars of annual sales are responsible for the vast majority of revenues and stock market value. International business comes with impor tant benefits, but it also raises essential concerns. Workers have far less bargaining power than companies do, and this imbalance is heightened by the mobility of multinational companies. National governments fear that tax or regulatory policies might discourage economic activity at home. When governments attempt to tax the profits of mobile multinational companies, teams of corporate lawyers and accountants swiftly

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Making the Global Economy Work for Every one

13

move the profits to tax havens. Indeed, tax avoidance now costs non- haven countries over $300 billion in tax revenues each year!

This does not mean that governments are powerless. Chapter 7 explains how economic policy should be modern- ized to suit the global economy. Countries may benefit from strengthening international cooperation. Even without inter- national agreements, however, there are many policy options for the United States. We can protect our corporate tax base through simple, commonsense mea sures, while focusing on building the fundamental strengths of the US economy.

Chapter  8 describes how immigrants are a source of tre- mendous strength for the US economy. Immigrants are often innovators and entrepreneurs; they are more likely to found businesses and to win Nobel prizes. Both high- skilled and low- skilled immigrants provide the economy with abilities that complement those of native workers. Immigrants boost eco- nomic growth and reduce the demographic pressures of an aging population. In turn, immigrants receive tremendous economic benefits from moving to the United States.

With so many advantages, what accounts for the backlash against immigrants? Backlash stems from cultural concerns and economic fears among middle- class workers. Yet, evidence shows that immigrants do not generate large negative wage ef- fects for workers; on the contrary, most workers benefit from immigrants. Even when small groups of workers are hurt, the large gains from immigration are sufficient to offset those harms. With these lessons in mind, Chapter 8 suggests immi- gration policy reforms.

Chapters 9 to 11 provide a roadmap to keep the gains from the global economy that are described in Chapters 3 to 8, while

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Introduction

14

responding in a serious, bold way to the prob lems described in Chapter 2. Foremost, we should not shoot ourselves in the foot with counterproductive policies. Beyond that, there are smart, substantial ways to combat middle- class stagnation and income in equality. Policy ideas fit into three big areas.

Chapter 9 describes better policies to equip workers for a global economy: modern trade agreements, better tools to help workers, improved support for communities, and strong in- vestments in fundamentals.

Chapter 10 describes the benefits of a grand bargain on tax reform: greater after- tax incomes for those left behind in prior de cades; a simpler tax system to reduce distortions, avoidance, and complexity; and lower tax rates and a cleaner planet due to reliance on a carbon tax. These reforms satisfy goals of both those on the left (who want a more progressive tax system and a cleaner environment) and those on the right (who want lower tax rates and fewer distortions).

Chapter 11 describes a better partnership between society and the business community. The goals of the business com- munity can be met, but a good partnership also requires more tax payments from some businesses, more business transpar- ency on both tax and labor issues, and robust antitrust laws to counter undue market power.

Fi nally, we must counter po liti cal polarization to respond to these big challenges. In Chapter 12, I conclude with some guiding princi ples and constructive solutions.

We are at an impor tant moment in our national history; crucial decisions lie ahead. Do we rise to meet the challenges of the world economy, modernizing our policies so that all Americans benefit from a more equitable globalization? Or do we turn inward, attempting to shelter workers from one aspect

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Making the Global Economy Work for Every one

15

of a storm that comes from many directions? Do we work with friends and allies to make more stable international institu- tions and a more prosperous world? Or do we alienate our friends by shortsightedly (and erroneously) putting Amer i ca first, and thereby making future conflicts and prob lems more difficult to solve? These questions are essential to our future. Let’s get the answers right.

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Two

Middle- Class Stagnation and Economic In equality

In recent de cades, middle- class incomes have stagnated, fuel- ing economic insecurity. Economic growth did not benefit American house holds as long expected; although growth con- tinued, in equality surged, and prosperity failed to reach the middle class. These trends began around 1980 and they continue today. This chapter takes a close look at this serious prob lem. What is happening to the American middle class? And what has caused these discouraging trends?

Does a Rising Tide Lift All Boats?

Economic growth is supposed to benefit every one. If national income (GDP, for gross domestic product) grows year after year, beyond the growth in population, we expect that economic growth should raise living standards of typical workers. Yet, when we compare growth in GDP per person to growth in me- dian house hold income, we see that something is clearly amiss.

In the past thirty years, GDP per capita has increased by about $20,000, an increase of over 60  percent. But the typical house hold has seen its income grow by only 16  percent in the same time period (fig. 2.1).

These figures explain why typical American house holds are not content with the pace of economic pro gress. The standard

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Middle- Class Stagnation and Economic In equality

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expectation that every generation would be better off than the one before it has been disappointed. Nearly 90  percent of children born in the 1940s outearned their parents, but that share has fallen steadily. For children born in 1970, only 60  percent out- earn their parents. For those born in the 1980s, only half do.1

How does so much GDP growth occur without benefiting the typical worker? In short, the growth has been accompa- nied by increasing in equality. This was not always the case. Pretax income growth over the period 1946 to 1980 exceeded 100  percent for the bottom 90  percent of the population, and the percentage growth in incomes was actually lower for the richest members of the population.

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Median Household Income GDP per-capita

Notes: Both series are indexed so that 1984 = 100. The median shows the typical house hold in the middle of the economy’s distribution of income. Unlike averages, medians are not affected by large incomes at the top of the distribution. Data source: Federal Reserve Economic Data.

Figure 2.1: Growth in US Median House hold Incomes Lags Behind GDP Per Capita

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Introduction

18

That pattern has since reversed. Between 1980 and 2014, the income growth of the bottom 50  percent of the population is literally invisible in the chart, at 1  percent. Growth in incomes for the middle 40  percent is 42  percent, and it accelerates from there, with the growth of the top 1  percent exceeding 200  percent.

As a result, there has been an increasing concentration of national income at the top of the income distribution. The top 1  percent now command a fifth of national income, 50  percent more income than is earned by the bottom half of the income distribution. The bottom 90  percent share has shrunk from 68  percent of all income in 1980 to only half of all income in 2015. These trends are a dramatic reversal from the experience of the post– World War II years, when income in equality fell between 1946 and 1970, and was relatively unchanged in the 1970s.

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Data source: Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman, “Distributional National Ac- counts: Methods and Estimates for the United States.” Working Paper 22945. NBER Working Pa- pers. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016.

Figure 2.2: Before 1980, Growth Lifted All Boats. Since Then, Not So Much.

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.

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Middle- Class Stagnation and Economic In equality

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88 19

90 19

92 19

94 19

96 19

98 20

00 20

02 20

04 20

06 20

08 20

10 20

12 20

14

Bottom 50% Share of Income Top 1% Share

Data source: World Top Incomes Database. Accessed March 14, 2017.

Figure 2.3: The Top 1 Percent and Bottom 50 Percent Trade Places

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

75%

19 64

19 66

19 68

19 70

19 72

19 74

19 76

19 78

19 80

19 82

19 84

19 86

19 88

19 90

19 92

19 94

19 96

19 98

20 00

20 02

20 04

20 06

20 08

20 10

20 12

20 14

Top 10% Share Bottom 90% Share

Data source: World Top Incomes Database. Accessed March 14, 2017.

Figure 2.4: In 2015, the Bottom 90 Percent Earn What the Top 10 Percent Earn

Clausing, Kimberly. Open : The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital, Harvard University Press, 2019. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/georgetown/detail.action?docID=5640333. Created from georgetown on 2020-12-14 09:11:36.


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